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Lost in the Fog of Miranda
George C. Thomas III*
For over two centuries, Anglo-American law used a test of “voluntariness” to determine
the admissibility of confessions. The twentieth century saw increasing skepticism that law
can determine which conscious utterances are “voluntary” and which are not. Suspects
who speak to police do so because they choose to speak rather than the alternative. If the
alternative is torture, that feels involuntary. But if it is merely a lengthy interrogation, who
can “prove” that the choice to answer is involuntary? Miranda v. Arizona was, in part,
the Court’s response to this skepticism. If judges cannot tell which utterances are
voluntary, why not give control of the interrogation over to the suspect? By telling the
suspect that he has a right to silence and a right to consult with counsel, police provide the
suspect with choices beyond answering or not answering questions. Thus, any subsequent
choice to talk to police is likely voluntary. But Miranda’s apparently elegant “free choice”
principle has metastasized into a dizzying array of formalistic doctrines and subdoctrines. This Essay documents the lower court confusion over one of the subdoctrines—the exception for so-called “booking questions.”

* Rutgers University Board of Governors Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr.
Distinguished Scholar. I benefitted greatly from editorial assistance and an excellent memorandum on
the circuit split on this issue by Lauren Garcia, Rutgers School of Law—Newark, Class of 2013.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court has identified a “booking question” exception to
1
2
the Miranda v. Arizona warning and waiver regime. The notion is that
police should not have to give warnings before asking an arrestee his name
and address. The Court, however, has never defined what it means by
“booking questions.”
This Essay will discuss a circuit split on that issue. Three approaches
to defining the exception have arisen. I will argue that, oddly enough, the
approach that has been adopted by only one circuit is far superior to the
other two approaches that have been widely adopted. I will attempt to
explain why the circuits that have adopted the other two approaches have
become lost in the fog of Miranda.
I. Setting the Scene: Our Old Friend MIRANDA
The Warren Court undoubtedly had multiple goals in mind when
deciding Miranda, its most sweeping—and probably most controversial—
criminal procedure case. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court is
replete with references to the uneven, and hence unfair, playing field of
the police interrogation room. Early in the opinion, the Court accuses
the police in the cases before the Court of “incommunicado interrogation
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self3
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.”
Warren gives many examples from the Inbau-Reid police
interrogation manual of techniques that police can use to move suspects to
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980).
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
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confess when they might otherwise have chosen to remain silent. These
include trickery, relentless interrogation, pretending sympathy, and
offering legal excuses that turn out not to be valid. A favorite example of
trickery is to have fictitious eyewitnesses pick the suspect out of a lineup
5
involving other, more serious offenses. One of the police manuals
explains: “It is expected that the subject will become desperate and confess
to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false
6
accusations.”
Warren also describes two of the four appellants in ways intended to
evoke sympathy from the reader: “The potentiality for compulsion is
forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent
Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced
sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an indigent
7
Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade.”
The opinion also resoundingly embraces notions of autonomy and
freedom from state power. Tracing the Fifth Amendment SelfIncrimination Clause back to John Lilburn and the Whigs, the Court notes:
We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege
against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor
with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. Perhaps
the critical historical event shedding light on its origins and evolution was
the trial of one John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made
to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him
to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject. He resisted the
oath and declaimed the proceedings, stating:
“Another fundamental right I then contended for, was, that no
man’s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer
to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended
to be so.”
On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the
inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber . . . . We cannot depart from this
8
noble heritage.

But beyond its embrace of autonomy, fairness, and individual
liberty, the Court must have intended its comprehensive re-writing of
Anglo-American interrogation law to provide more clarity and certainty
than the hoary “voluntariness” doctrine that had been around since the
1600s. The notion underlying that doctrine, which appears in a
9
rudimentary form in a 1295 English case, is that confessions that are not
4. Id. at 449–55.
5. See id. at 453.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 457.
8. Id. at 458–60 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
9. Y.B. 23 Edw. 1, fol. RS 543–45, pl. App. II [23] (1295) (Eng.), available at http://www.bu.edu/
phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=1171 (Seipp No. 1295.023rs). Richard Leo and I discuss this case
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the product of the will of the defendant should not be used to convict
him. While the underlying intuition is attractive, the concept is ultimately
unsound, if not incoherent. As Wigmore pointed out over a century ago,
confessions entail a conscious choice, and thus all confessions “are and
10
must be voluntary.” Or, more colorfully, “between the rack and a false
confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable;
11
but it is none the less voluntarily chosen.” Aristotle recognized the
problem in identifying involuntary human acts when humans choose a
disagreeable option: “Such acts, therefore, are voluntary; but in the
abstract perhaps involuntary, for no one would choose any such act in
12
itself.”
Justice Frankfurter, one of the Court’s deepest thinkers, tried to
save the Supreme Court’s voluntariness doctrine from incoherence. As
Louis Seidman has noted, throughout Frankfurter’s “long and brilliant
career” he “returned to the confession problem with obsessive regularity.
The story of his ultimate, utterly abject and deeply personal failure to
make sense of the area poignantly embodies all of the difficulties” in the
13
voluntariness inquiry.
In 1961, Frankfurter made a last, valiant effort in Culombe v.
Connecticut, writing a lengthy, scholarly opinion that sought to create a
jurisprudential framework within which the suspect’s internal psychological
state could be inferred from “external, ‘phenomenological’ occurrences
14
and events.” It was a spectacular failure. Though Frankfurter announced
the judgment of the Court, which meant he had been assigned the
“majority” opinion, only Justice Stewart joined Frankfurter’s opinion.
Chief Justice Warren agreed that the confessions were inadmissible,
but refused to join Frankfurter’s opinion because it “has not been the
custom of the Court . . . to write lengthy and abstract dissertations” when
15
deciding cases. Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan agreed that the
confessions were inadmissible and also refused to join Frankfurter’s
16
opinion. Perhaps even more devastating to Frankfurter’s attempt to

in George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, Confessions of Guilt: From Torture to MIRANDA and
Beyond 24–26 (2012).
10. 2 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials
at Common Law § 824, at 145 (2d ed. 1923).
11. Id.
12. 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle, bk. III, § 1, at 1752–53 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
13. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 673, 729–30 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
14. 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961).
15. Id. at 635–36 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
16. See id. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring). The opinions of
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas are labeled as “concurring” opinions, but they both make
clear that they are not joining Frankfurter’s opinion. Id. at 636, 639–41.
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bring clarity to the confessions problem, Justices Harlan, Clark, and
Whittaker accepted his analytical structure and reached precisely the
opposite conclusion—that the confession was voluntary: “The Justices
who concurred on an analytical framework for resolving the problem
disagreed on the result . . . while the Justices who concurred on the result
disagreed on the analytic framework producing that result. In short, the
17
Culombe opinion was a total disaster.” If Aristotle, Wigmore, and
Frankfurter could not make sense of the voluntary/involuntary distinction
when it came to conscious choices, no one was going to succeed.
Miranda was the new broom that sweeps clean. The Court admitted
that in “these cases, we might not find the defendants’ statements to have
18
been involuntary in traditional terms,” and it explicitly replaced the
voluntariness test with an elaborate requirement to ensure that suspects
chose to answer police questions in an exercise of their will. Thus the
Court required police, prior to custodial interrogation, to provide the
now-famous warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel. At one level, Miranda succeeded brilliantly. In the vast majority
of cases, police give the warnings, the suspect waives the rights, and the
resulting statements are introduced without an argument about whether
19
they were voluntary. Simplicity and clarity are achieved.
Where Miranda has failed to achieve simplicity and clarity, however,
is in the vast doctrinal web that the Supreme Court has spun over the last
half century while working out the details of the Miranda regime.
20
“Custody” and “interrogation” had to be defined in a series of cases.
21
Waiver has, until recently, proved to be a doctrinally thorny problem.
We learned that the failure to give warnings did not usually poison later
22
statements after warnings were belatedly given. We learned that
17. Seidman, supra note 13, at 733.
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
19. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study
of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 858–62 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 282–83 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Stories
About Miranda, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1959, 1962–74 (2004).
20. See generally Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012) (custody); J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (custody); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) (custody); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (custody); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (interrogation);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (interrogation); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)
(custody).
21. See generally Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98; United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039
(1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), has largely
solved the doctrinal problem by holding that the State proves waiver when a suspect is given warnings,
there is no evidence that he does not understand the warnings, and he answers police questions.
22. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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physical evidence is admissible even if found by virtue of statements
23
made without warnings. We learned that there is an exception for
situations where public safety is threatened; no warnings are necessary in
24
those situations. I turn now to the booking question exception.

II. Establishing, and Complicating, an Exception to MIRANDA
The Court told us in dicta in 1980, and in a later plurality opinion,
that there is an exception to the Miranda requirement of warnings and
25
waiver for “booking questions.” My thesis is that the Miranda doctrinal
web has become so complex that most courts have lost sight of the
reason that there is a booking question exception in the first place. If
courts cannot reason their way through the relatively simple notion of a
booking question exception, one wonders how well they are applying the
other complex doctrines and sub-doctrines of Miranda. This raises the
possibility that while Miranda can be judged a success at the pragmatic,
day-to-day level, it might be as much a doctrinal failure as the
voluntariness test that it replaced.
A. The Exception Emerges
To understand the booking question exception, it helps to begin
with Miranda. Warnings are not required for every interaction between
police and potential suspects, but are only required when the police
conduct custodial interrogation. It is custodial interrogation that the
Court identified as the cause of the inherent compulsion that potentially
deprives suspects of the “free choice” to decide whether to answer police
questions. Custody is generally going to be present in every case where a
suspect is asked booking questions after being arrested, so the issue
becomes whether booking questions constitute “interrogation” for
purposes of Miranda.
The Court defined “interrogation” in Rhode Island v. Innis as not
only “express questioning” but also “any words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
26
response from the suspect.” That leaves open the issue of how to
determine whether questions are considered “normally attendant to arrest
and custody” and thus exempt from the Innis definition of interrogation.

23.
24.
25.
26.

See generally Patane, 542 U.S. 630.
See generally New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Innis, 446 U.S. 291.
See generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Innis, 446 U.S. 291.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
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B. The Exception Clouds: PENNSYLVANIA V. MUNIZ
27

Part of the complexity results from Pennsylvania v. Muniz, a badly
split 1990 opinion that failed to clarify the scope of the “booking
question” category. Eight members of the Court agreed that the answers
to seven routine booking questions—questions that elicited answers
about the suspect’s name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of
28
birth, and current age—were admissible. But the Court split 4–4 as to
why (Justice Marshall dissented).
Justice Brennan, who announced the opinion of the Court, would
have held that the answers were admissible because they “fall within a
‘routine booking question’ exception which exempts from Miranda’s
coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical data necessary to complete
29
booking or pretrial services.’” The plurality also embraced the view of the
state court “that the first seven questions were ‘requested for recordkeeping purposes only,’ and therefore the questions appear reasonably
30
related to the police’s administrative concerns.” This rationale seems
consistent with the language from Innis suggesting an exception to the
“should-have-known” rule for questions “normally attendant to arrest and
custody.” But five members of the Court rejected the plurality’s view.
Justice Marshall, writing alone, said the booking question exception
would necessitate difficult, time-consuming litigation over whether
particular questions asked during booking are “routine,” whether they
are necessary to secure biographical information, whether that
information is itself necessary for recordkeeping purposes, and
whether the questions are—despite their routine nature—designed to
31
elicit incriminating testimony.

Instead, Marshall would have opted for a rule that was faithful to
“Miranda’s fundamental principle that the doctrine should be clear so
32
that it can be easily applied by both police and courts.” Thus, the “far
better course would be to maintain the clarity of the doctrine by
requiring police to preface all direct questioning of a suspect with
33
Miranda warnings if they want his responses to be admissible at trial.”
But Marshall wrote alone. Chief Justice Rehnquist, like Brennan
writing for four members of the Court, raised more complex objections
to the plurality’s booking question exception. Rehnquist argued that
answers to questions seeking information do not expose the suspect to
27. 496 U.S. 592.
28. See id. at 590–92.
29. Id. at 601 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12,
Muniz, 496 U.S. 592 (No. 89-213)).
30. Id. at 601–02 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 610 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 609.
33. Id. at 610.
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the classic “trilemma” that the Fifth Amendment privilege is supposed to
34
avoid. In a classic privilege situation, the witness who is under oath is
asked a question that might require an incriminating response. As the
Court observed in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
35
Harbor, this witness can tell the truth and incriminate himself, testify
falsely and commit perjury, or remain silent and face contempt of court.
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects the latter option and thus
avoids the trilemma.
Rehnquist said that suspects asked informational questions are not
subject to this trilemma. In his view, the suspect will not be compelled to
state a falsehood about his age or name: “Muniz would no more have felt
compelled to fabricate a false [answer] than one who cannot read the
letters on an eye chart feels compelled to fabricate false letters; nor does
36
a wrong guess call into question a speaker’s veracity.” In sum, “the
potential for giving a bad guess does not subject the suspect to the truthfalsity-silence predicament that renders a response testimonial and,
37
therefore, within the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Because
asking routine questions does not, in the view of four members of the
Muniz Court, subject a suspect to a threat of compelled selfincrimination, “it is unnecessary to determine whether the questions fall
within the ‘routine booking question’ exception to Miranda Justice
38
Brennan recognizes.”
The Rehnquist opinion is a puzzle. The aspects of routine questioning
that led him to find that it does not threaten compulsory self-incrimination
are the same aspects that presumably led Justice Brennan to conclude that
routine booking questions are an exception to Miranda, yet Rehnquist,
speaking for four justices, refused to join the booking question part of
Brennan’s opinion. Thus, there is technically no majority opinion on
Brennan’s routine booking question exception, but eight members of the
Court recognized that routine questions do not threaten the Fifth
Amendment privilege. I think it is fair to say that there is a “holding” that
routine questions do not trigger Fifth Amendment privilege protections.
So as of the Court’s last word on routine questions and the Fifth
Amendment privilege, here is where we stand: The Court suggested in
dicta in Innis that questions “normally attendant to arrest and custody”
do not fall within Miranda, while eight members of the Court in Muniz

34. Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting
in part).
35. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
36. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part,
and dissenting in part).
37. Id. at 608.
38. Id.
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held that routine questions do not implicate the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The reason is that suspects do not feel the same pressure to
answer routine booking questions as questions targeted to whether they
have committed crime. It is a sensible exception to Miranda and the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
And how have lower courts responded to this sensible doctrinal
move on the part of the Supreme Court? Like a child lost in the fog.
C. Divergent Approaches Ensue: ALFORD V. TEXAS
The circuit courts of appeals have used three different approaches to
resolve that issue in the “booking questions” context. To illustrate these
divergent approaches—and the issues that they raise—consider a case
39
where the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari, Alford v. Texas.
During the evening of January 29, 2009, police observed Cecil
Alford getting out of a vehicle with an open container of beer in his
40
hand. Police approached Alford and asked him if he had any narcotics
on him. He denied having any drugs or weapons on his person but began
to back away. Police then informed Alford that he was being detained
and was not free to leave. When Alford attempted to flee, the officers
41
arrested him for evading arrest and drove him to the police station.
One of the officers noticed Alford squirming in the back seat. Alford
claimed it was because his side hurt. After taking Alford out of the patrol
car, the officers searched the back seat, pursuant to departmental
procedure, and discovered a computer thumb drive (“flash drive”) directly
42
beneath a clear plastic bag containing pills.
The officers then escorted Alford to the booking area. While Alford
was being searched by facility personnel, an officer held up the flash
drive and, without providing Miranda warnings, asked what it was and
43
whether it belonged to him. Alford responded that it was a memory
drive and that it belonged to him. The flash drive was not identified as
evidence. Rather, it was placed with Alford’s other personal property.
The pills, however, were identified as evidence, sent away for analysis,
44
and revealed to be more than four grams of ecstasy.
Alford filed a pretrial motion to exclude his responses to the
questions regarding the flash drive on the grounds that the questioning
constituted custodial interrogation and that the failure to provide Miranda

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Alford v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 122 (2012).
Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 651.
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warnings made his responses inadmissible. The trial court denied the
motion and admitted his responses, emphasizing that the flash drive was
never identified as evidence and concluding that the officer was asking
46
routine questions to process Alford’s personal property. At trial, the
prosecution introduced Alford’s statements regarding the flash drive to
establish his possession of the bag of ecstasy, and the jury convicted him of
47
possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by admitting
Alford’s statements because they were made during normal,
48
administrative processing.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest court for
criminal appeals in Texas—affirmed, holding that the test is “whether the
question reasonably relates to a legitimate administrative concern,
49
applying an objective standard.” It further held that if a question lacks a
legitimate administrative concern, then the trial court should determine
the admissibility of the statement “under the general should-have-known
50
test for custodial interrogation” from Innis.
The Texas court acknowledged that other courts had taken different
51
approaches that could be grouped into two categories. First, some
courts apply the basic definition of interrogation from Innis: “any words
or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are
52
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
This is essentially an objective test, though Innis conceded that the
53
officer’s subjective intent could be relevant to the objective question.
Second, some courts apply a subjective test that turns on whether the
54
officer intended to evoke an incriminating response.
Almost all courts follow either the basic Innis test or the intent test
when identifying when questions are subject to the booking question
exception. As I will seek to show in the rest of this Essay, I believe that
these courts have simply gotten lost in the fog of the ultra-complex
Miranda doctrine.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 652; see id. at 652 n.7.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id. at 659–60.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 658–59.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
Id. at 301 n.7.
Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 658–59.
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III. Comparing the Tests
As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Alford, the
55
courts have fractured into three approaches. Some define the exception
from an objective point of view—that is, whether the officer asking the
booking question should have known it was likely to elicit an
56
incriminating response. Other courts consider the particular officer’s
subjective intent, asking whether he or she intended to draw out an
57
incriminating response from the suspect. Finally, and least common, is
58
the approach of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. That court, like the
Alford court in Texas, asks simply whether the question was reasonably
59
related to a “legitimate administrative concern.” As discussed below,
this last, least-followed approach logically—and most accurately—flows
from Supreme Court precedent and provides the simplest path out of this
confused corner of Miranda.
A. Objective Should-Have-Known Test
In his petition for certiorari, Alford characterized the objective test
from Innis as the appropriate standard and also the majority approach.
60
61
Five U.S. courts of appeals and twelve state high courts have adopted
the standard. The formulation itself is straight out of Innis: “[T]he
inquiry into whether the booking exception is thus inapplicable is
actually an objective one: whether the questions and circumstances were
such that the officer should reasonably have expected the question to
62
elicit an incriminating response.” The Eighth Circuit explained:
A request for routine information necessary for basic identification
purposes is not interrogation under Miranda, even if the information
turns out to be incriminating. Only if the government agent should
reasonably be aware that the information sought, while merely for basic
identification purposes in the usual case, is directly relevant to the
63
substantive offense charged, will the question be subject to scrutiny.

55. Id. at 658.
56. Id. at 655.
57. See id. at 655–56.
58. See id. at 658.
59. Id. at 657.
60. Including the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit courts of appeals. See Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Alford, 358 S.W.3d 647 (No. 11-1318).
61. Including Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
62. United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Doe,
878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989)).
63. United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.
McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1985)).
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The First Circuit provided three examples of when an officer asking
a routine booking question might be charged with the knowledge that it
might elicit incriminating evidence:
For example, asking a person’s name might reasonably be expected to
elicit an incriminating response if the individual were under arrest for
impersonating a law enforcement officer or for some comparable
offense focused on identity; likewise, asking an individual’s date of
birth might be expected to elicit an incriminating response if the
individual were in custody on charges of underage drinking; and
questions about an individual’s Social Security number might be likely
to elicit an incriminating response where the person is charged with
Social Security fraud. In such scenarios, the requested information is so
clearly and directly linked to the suspected offense that we would
expect a reasonable officer to foresee that his questions might elicit an
64
incriminating response from the individual being questioned.
65

In United States v. Mata-Abundiz, the defendant was arrested and
66
charged with possession of a firearm by an alien. After serving ten days in
jail, the defendant was questioned by an Immigration and Naturalization
Services (“INS”) criminal investigator who was aware of the charges but
67
did not provide a Miranda warning. The investigator asked the defendant
about his citizenship, and the defendant replied that he was a citizen of
68
Mexico. The Ninth Circuit determined that the booking exception did not
apply because the investigator’s questioning was reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response—given that the defendant’s alienage constituted
69
an essential element of the crime for which he was charged. The court
also emphasized the fact that the questioning took place ten days after
the suspect arrived at the jail and, therefore, did not resemble a routine
70
booking procedure.
71
In United States v. Brown, by comparison, asking the suspect his
name at the scene of the arrest was held not to be interrogation. The
Eighth Circuit noted that the asking for “routine biographical data” is
not interrogation but then embraced what it had written in an earlier
case: “Only if the government agent should reasonably be aware that the
information sought, while merely for basic identification purposes in the
usual case, is directly relevant to the substantive offense charged, will the
72
questioning be subject to scrutiny.” Thus the booking question exception,

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Reyes, 225 F.3d at 77.
717 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id.
101 F.3d 1272 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1274 (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1985)).
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as understood by the Eighth Circuit, is that requests for routine
biographical data qualify unless the officer “should reasonably be aware”
that the answers might be incriminating. In effect, this makes the Innis test
the only one that matters. If the defense can show that the officer should
have known that a routine question would produce an incriminating
response, then the routine nature of the question does not matter.
The reader might wonder what is wrong with applying the Innis
objective test in the booking context. The results in McLaughlin and
Mata-Abundiz seem intuitively appealing. The doctrinal problem is that
applying Innis renders incoherent the dicta in Innis that stated the
standard for determining when questions constituted interrogation.
Recall that the Court said that interrogation consisted of “any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
73
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” If the Innis test will
do for all questioning, then the parenthetical is unnecessary. More
importantly, courts that apply the Innis objective test to routine booking
questions are ignoring the holding in Muniz. Whatever the full scope of
the overlap between the plurality and the opinion concurring in the
result, the overlap necessarily exempts routine questions from Miranda
and the Fifth Amendment privilege. If the question is a routine one,
74
under the combined opinions in Muniz, then Innis does not apply. To
subject those questions to Innis is, well, to be lost in a fog.
The pragmatic problem with applying Innis to these routine questions
75
is that it does not work very well. In United States v. Reyes, Reyes was
interviewed by an INS agent—assigned to work with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)—for the purpose of booking him
76
on drug charges. The INS agent asked Reyes a series of questions
directly from a DEA personal history form, including his name, where he
77
was born, and his social security number. Reyes provided the agent with
false information for each question, was subsequently convicted of making
a false statement to a government agent, and sought to have his false
78
responses suppressed on Miranda grounds. The First Circuit found that
the questions fell within the ambit of the Miranda booking exception

73. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
74. To be sure, there is a troubling footnote in the plurality opinion, which exempts from the
routine questioning exception questions “that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.” See
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990). This has no effect on the holding that the Innis
test is inappropriate in the booking question context, and I will discuss it in Part III.B, which deals
with the subjective intent test.
75. 225 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2000).
76. Id. at 74.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 75.
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because the questions came directly from the DEA booking form and
because the questions could not “reasonably be expected to elicit an
79
incriminating response.” The First Circuit was untroubled by the agent’s
80
admission that he suspected the defendant might not be a citizen.
Since the INS agent was reading booking questions from an official
form, a court can easily hold that these questions do not implicate the
Fifth Amendment privilege. One gets there either from the plurality in
Muniz or Rehnquist’s opinion concurring in the result in Muniz. But to
get that result under Innis requires a sleight of hand. A good marker for
what an officer should have known about whether his question was likely
to elicit an incriminating response, the Innis test, is whether he believes
that the suspect will provide a false answer. Just what would an INS
agent expect a suspect to do when the agent believes he is not a citizen
and then asks where he was born? To pretend that this question does not
violate the Innis standard is disingenuous. And it is unnecessary because
Muniz settles the issue by avoiding the Innis standard entirely.
But if the courts that apply Innis are missing how Muniz clarifies
Innis, the courts that apply the subjective intent test are missing the
plurality status of Muniz.
B. Subjective Intent Test
As an alternative standard, Alford identified the subjective standard
81
known as the intent test adopted by four U.S. courts of appeals and five
82
state high courts. The standard itself is derived from footnote fourteen
in the Muniz decision, which stated that the booking exception does not
allow police to “ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to
83
elicit incriminatory admissions.” Both the Fifth and the Tenth circuit
courts have cited directly to the Muniz footnote to preface their subjective
84
intent analysis.
In United States v. Virgen-Moreno, the Fifth Circuit found that the
questions asked were designed to elicit incriminatory admissions and
85
therefore did not fall within the Miranda routine booking exception.

79. Id. at 77.
80. Id.; see United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Miranda
booking exception applied where the arresting officer asked the defendant his name and the defendant
provided a fake name, because the defendant’s name was not directly relevant to the substantive drug
crime charged).
81. Including the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at 12–13.
82. Including Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma. See id.
83. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990).
84. See United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993).
85. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d at 294.
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The defendant divulged incriminating information about his past
residences during an interview to obtain information required by a
86
202 Personal Background Form. The court concluded that the agents
subjectively intended to elicit incriminating information from the
defendant because they repeatedly asked the defendant whether he lived
at certain addresses—one of which was later linked to the charged
conspiracy—and once the agents were able to get the defendant to admit
that he lived at one of the addresses, they asked him several additional
87
questions to determine how long he had lived there. The Fifth Circuit
explicitly based its holding on Muniz footnote fourteen, even though as
88
the citation reveals, the court knew that it was a plurality opinion.
The Tenth Circuit also cited to the Muniz footnote fourteen in its
booking exception analysis in United States v. Parra, but it confused the
analysis by citing a Ninth Circuit decision which adopted the should89
have-known standard. As a result, it is unclear whether the court
employed a strict subjective intent standard, an objective should-haveknown standard, or a combination of the two. The facts satisfy either
standard because the INS agent admitted that he intended to elicit an
incriminating response when he asked the defendant his real name, which
90
he knew to be linked to an incriminating immigration file. Consequently,
the court did not have to engage in any factual analysis as to whether the
agent subjectively intended to elicit the incriminating response or should
have known it was reasonably likely to do so. And so it remains unclear
whether the Tenth Circuit has actually adopted the subjective intent
standard.
While these courts are reading footnote fourteen properly, they
ignore that there is nothing in Muniz to suggest that there is a majority
supporting footnote fourteen. Indeed, there is quite the opposite. For
Rehnquist, the key to the admissibility of answers to routine questions is
that the suspect would not feel the compulsive pressure of the trilemma
that the privilege is designed to avoid. But this suspect-centered lens has
nothing at all to do with the intent of the person asking the question.
Because the Court in Innis made clear that the intent of the interrogator
was, at best, marginally relevant to the definition of interrogation, it is
remarkable that lower courts use a footnote in a later plurality opinion to

86. Id. at 293. A 202 Personal Background Form is a standard two-page form completed by Drug
Enforcement Administration agents at the time of an arrest, which identifies the person being arrested
and sets forth the actions being taken against them. Butler v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 368 F. Supp. 2d
776, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
87. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d at 294.
88. Id.
89. See Parra, 2 F.3d at 1068.
90. Id. at 1067.
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deviate from that clarity. After Innis formulated the “reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” definition, the Court
said:
The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This
focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to
vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against
coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the
91
underlying intent of the police.

It is difficult to be much clearer than that. That some lower courts
apparently believe a footnote in a plurality opinion is sufficient to ignore
the clear language of Innis raises a jurisprudential question. Can a clear
statement in a plurality opinion somehow “overrule” clear dicta in an
earlier majority opinion? I think the answer to that is no. The statement
in the plurality opinion is dicta, and I would think that dicta endorsed by
six members of the Court in Innis should be given more weight than dicta
endorsed by only four justices.
If subjective intent is not the right standard, and if Innis suggests that
the should-have-known test is inappropriate for routine booking questions,
then what approach is left? The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wins my
prize for the best analysis.
C. Legitimate Administrative Concern Standard
To determine whether a statement is admissible under the Miranda
booking exception, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “a
trial court must determine whether the question reasonably relates to a
92
legitimate administrative concern, applying an objective standard.” The
court provided four main reasons for adopting the legitimate
administrative concern standard, as opposed to the general should-haveknown standard.
First, the court noted that imposing the alternative should-have93
known standard would render the Miranda booking exception a nullity.
It would require courts to analyze booking questions precisely the same
way that they would analyze any other question. Second, the court
reasoned that applying the should-have-known test ignores the express
language set forth in Innis, which excluded questions that are “normally
attendant to arrest and custody” from the meaning of custodial
94
interrogation, giving rise to the Miranda booking exception.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 659–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Id. at 660.
Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301).
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Third, the court addressed the contents of footnote fourteen in the
Muniz plurality opinion and determined it could not possibly be
interpreted as requiring courts to employ a should-have-known standard
to routine booking questions because that reading would negate all of the
booking exception analysis set forth in the text of the plurality opinion
95
itself. Lastly, the court pointed out that the applicable “legitimate
administrative concern” standard affords law enforcement administrative
efficiency; it allows them “to quickly and consistently administer booking
procedures” and to “ensure the safety of facility personnel and other
96
inmates, as well as the suspect.” By contrast, the should-have-known
standard would have a burdensome effect on law enforcement because
they would be required to analyze every single booking question before
asking it in order to determine whether it is likely to elicit an incriminating
97
response.
Applying the “legitimate administrative concern” standard to the
underlying facts of the case, the court found “that the totality of the
circumstances objectively show that [the officer’s] questions were
98
reasonably related to a legitimate administrative concern.” As a result,
Alford’s responses to those questions were properly admissible against
him. The court emphasized that law enforcement has a legitimate interest
in the identification and storage of an inmate’s property, as the Texas
Administrative Code requires inmate property to be inventoried,
99
recorded, and stored upon intake. Here, the relevant question pertained
to whether the non-contraband item found in the back seat of the patrol
100
car belonged to Alford. The court emphasized that the officer asked
Alford the questions while booking him into jail, as well as the fact that
after he confirmed that the flash drive belonged to Alford, it was
immediately placed with his personal property for safekeeping by facility
101
personnel. Additionally, the court noted that, in the Fourth Amendment
context, the Supreme Court has determined that it is reasonable for police
to search a person’s personal effects during booking and jailing as part of
102
routine administrative procedure.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 661.
97. Id. Alford never asserted that the officer subjectively intended to elicit an incriminating
statement from him when he asked whether the flash drive belonged to him. Id. at 660 n.27. The Texas
court thus did not consider the subjective intent standard—whether there is an additional limit to the
Miranda booking exception when a questioning officer actually intends to use a routine question to
elicit an incriminating response. Id.
98. Id. at 662.
99. Id. at 661.
100. Id. at 662.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 661 (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983)).
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The “legitimate administrative concern” standard avoids the
doctrinal embarrassments of the other two standards. And it does so at
no cost. It seems to reach the same result in the cases applying the other
two approaches.
In United States v. Mata-Abundiz, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
government’s booking-exception argument after applying the objective,
103
should-have-known test. But the court emphasized the fact that the
questioning took place ten days after the suspect arrived at the jail and,
104
therefore, did not bear the semblance of a routine booking procedure.
That is enough to show that the questioning did not sufficiently relate to
a legitimate administrative concern; there is no need to apply the shouldhave-known standard to rule that the answer was inadmissible as a
booking question.
In United States v. Reyes, the agent asked Reyes a series of questions
directly from a DEA personal history form for the purpose of booking
105
him. That is enough to bring the questions within the “legitimate
administrative concern” standard, and there is no need to worry about
the fact that the agent suspected that Reyes might not be a citizen.
The key facts in United States v. Virgen-Moreno were that the
interview was conducted after the defendant was booked and that the
agents repeatedly challenged his answers when he did not initially give
106
an address that would have incriminated him. The Fifth Circuit found
that the questions asked were designed to elicit incriminatory admissions
107
and therefore did not fall within the Miranda routine booking exception.
True enough, but why not just say that questioning that is post-booking
and has an adversarial quality is not related to a legitimate administrative
concern? Similarly, in United States v. Parra, the agent questioned a
108
suspect, not while he was being booked, but prior to his making bond.
The agent admitted that he tricked the suspect into confessing that he
109
had given a false name when initially booked. The Tenth Circuit
seemed to hold that this intent took the questions out of the booking
exception, but it is much easier to say that questioning a suspect after
booking and before he makes bond does not relate to a legitimate
administrative concern.
Thus the Texas approach to the booking question exception seems
to me far superior to the other approaches, both as a doctrinal and as a

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id.
225 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 2000).
265 F.3d 276, 294 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 293–94.
2 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 1993).
Id.
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policy matter. Yet it has been adopted only by the D.C. Circuit Court of
110
Appeals. Only one of two explanations is possible. First, I might be
wrong. The reader can make that judgment for herself. But if I am right,
then it must be that the other circuits have simply lost their way in the
Miranda fog that the Court has created. The circuit courts adopting
either the subjective or objective test have lost sight of the reason to have
a booking exception in the first place: to permit police to ask questions
required for the administrative task of booking the suspect. Since that is
the reason, then why would anyone care about either the objective or
subjective intent of the officer asking the question?
The fault might not lie with the courts of appeals. In its effort to
replace the failed voluntariness test, the Supreme Court has created a
complex universe. Indeed, the Court itself has sometimes lost its way in
the universe of its creation. Recall that Miranda’s avowed purpose was to
negate the inherent compulsion that is created by custodial police
interrogation. Yet in Innis, the Court conceded that the police tactics
created “subtle compulsion” and then proceeded to hold that Miranda
was not violated because the police tactic did not rise to the level of
111
interrogation as defined by Miranda. In effect, Innis replaced the
language of the Fifth Amendment (no person “shall be compelled in any
112
criminal case to be a witness against himself”) with the language in
Miranda interpreting the Fifth Amendment. Consider the following—
remarkable—passage from Innis:
[I]t may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did say, that the
respondent was subjected to “subtle compulsion.” But that is not the
end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect’s
incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part
of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to
113
elicit an incriminating response.

Thus, if Miranda is not violated, the use of compulsion is not a Fifth
Amendment violation.
The Court’s confusion in Innis and the confusion surrounding the
booking question exception that this Essay has detailed are a vindication
of a view that Justice Thomas expressed in a dissent in a double jeopardy
case in 1992:
Our constitutional law has become ever more complex in recent
decades. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law draws
force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its
application. As the complexity of legal doctrines increases, moreover,
so too does the danger that their foundational principles will become

110.
111.
112.
113.

See generally United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Rhode Island v. Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 292 (1980).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 303.
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obscured. I fear that danger has been realized here. So engrossed is the
Court in applying the multifactor balancing test set forth in Barker that
it loses sight of the nature and purpose of the speedy trial guarantee set
114
forth in the Sixth Amendment.

Conclusion
The lower courts on the booking question exception have, I think,
lost sight of the reason the Court recognized an exception in the first
place. The exception exists because that process, by definition, does not
pose the same risk of compulsion as police interrogation. Once we are
clear about the goal, once we clear away a bit of the Miranda fog, we can
see that the Texas approach is the right one.
I agree with the implicit assumption of the Court in Miranda that
the voluntariness test was not doing a satisfactory job identifying
statements that should be suppressed because of police compulsion. I
think, for all its faults, Miranda probably does a better job ensuring that
most statements made to police are not the product of compulsion. To be
sure, many scholars have documented some spectacular failures of
115
Miranda, but in the ordinary, run-of-the-mill case, I think it is better
suited for the compulsion task than the voluntariness test (although this
may well be damning with faint praise). What has been lost is the explicit
focus on the goal of keeping compelled statements from being used
against the accused. Innis was subjected to “subtle compulsion,” but his
statements were admitted anyway. The Court has achieved (relative)
precision at the cost of confused thinking.

114. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
115. To save space, I cite only my favorite example, Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2002),
uncovered and brilliantly analyzed in Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It
Irrelevant?, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 461 (1998).

